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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920142-CA 
v. : Priority No. 11 
WADE WAGSTAFF, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress in the First Judicial District 
Court in and for Cache County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Gordon J. Low, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) & (f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly conclude that there is no 
requirement under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1990) that the 
evidence with which a defendant allegedly tampered be admissible 
at trial for other purposes in order for a prosecution on 
tampering with evidence charges to go forward? When reviewing a 
trial court's interpretation of statutory law, Utah appellate 
courts apply a correction of error standard and accord no 
deference to the trial court. Ward v, Richfield City, 798 P.2d 
757, 759 (Utah 1990); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules for a determination of this case are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-510. Tampering with evidence. 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he 
knows to be false with a purpose to deceive a public 
servant who is or may be engaged in a proceeding or 
investigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with tampering with evidence, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 
(1990), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992) (R. 3). The information was amended to 
add a third charge, interference with an arresting officer, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(Supp. 1992) (R. 1-2). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and to 
dismiss the charges against him (R. 37-67). At the hearing that 
was held on defendant's motion, the State argued that under the 
evidence tampering statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1990), 
there is no requirement that the evidence forming the basis of 
the charge be the product of a legal seizure (Transcript of 
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress dated February 20, 
1992, at 5-6 [hereinafter "Tr."]). Consequently, the State 
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agreed to stipulate for purposes of the motion, with respect to 
the charge of tampering with evidence only, that the evidence was 
illegally seized. The State further indicated to the trial court 
that if the court agreed with the State's interpretation of the 
statute and denied defendant's motion with respect to the 
evidence tampering charge, the State would move to dismiss the 
two misdemeanor charges with prejudice (Tr. 17-18). 
Under these circumstances, the trial court had to 
resolve a single legal question: Is there any requirement under § 
76-8-510 that the evidence with which a defendant allegedly 
tampered be admissible at a trial for other purposes in order for 
a prosecution on tampering with evidence charges to go forward? 
Following the hearing, the court issued a memorandum decision (R. 
134-36). In its decision, the trial court explained that 
resolution of the "issue may turn on the definition of evidence. 
Evidence to be admitted into the trial is in fact not evidence 
until it is received. On the other hand[,] evidence under 
Section 76-8-510, U.C.A., is actually defined as 'anything' which 
may be used in a proceeding or investigation" (R. 135). 
After discussing various policy considerations that 
supported its interpretation of the provision, the trial court 
concluded that the statute did not require that evidence be 
admissible for other purposes in order for a tampering with 
evidence charge to proceed. On that basis alone, the trial court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to the charge 
of tampering with evidence. It indicated that the balance of the 
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motion would still be addressable as to the two misdemeanor 
counts, but noted that the State had previously stated that it 
would dismiss those charges (R. 134-35). 
The State prepared the appropriate order and moved to 
dismiss the remaining charges against defendant. Defendant 
petitioned for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order, 
and this Court granted defendant's petition (R. 128-33, 144). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Given the nature of the issue presented in this 
interlocutory appeal, and the procedural facts provided in the 
Statement of the Case section of this brief, there is no reason 
to recite the facts of this case in detail. Moreover, given the 
trial court's decision to resolve defendant's motion to suppress 
based solely on the question of statutory interpretation, there 
is a paucity of facts in the record. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-510 (1990). Nothing in the plain language of the statute 
requires that the evidence with which one is accused of tampering 
be evidence that would otherwise be admissible at trial. Indeed, 
the plain language of § 76-8-510(1) prohibits the alteration, 
destruction, concealment or removal of "anything with a purpose 
to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation" (emphasis added). The trial court properly 
construed the term "anything" according to its common meaning, 
and applied the statute in keeping with its plain language. 
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Moreover, defendant's assertion that the term 
"anything," as used in the statute, "must be construed as 
'anything which might be used by the state as evidence,'" is 
unsupported by legislative intent. Br. of Appellant at 9. A 
review of the statute's legislative history indicates that it is 
based on a virtually identical provision of the Model Penal Code. 
The commentary accompanying the Model Penal Code provision makes 
clear that a person may be prosecuted for tampering with 
evidence, regardless of whether that evidence would be admissible 
at a trial. 
The trial court correctly interpreted the plain 
language of the statute, and its interpretation is in accord with 
the legislative intent underlying the provision. This Court 
should therefore uphold the trial court's interpretation of § 76-
8-510 and affirm its denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-8-510 
ALLOWS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF A TAMPERING 
WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE EVEN IF THE MATERIAL 
WITH WHICH DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY TAMPERED IS 
DEEMED INADMISSIBLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 
The trial court properly focused its interpretation of 
S 76-8-510 on the plain language of the provision and correctly 
interpreted that language. 
It is well established that where statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, Utah courts construe the statute according 
to its plain language. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 
5 
P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); State v. Baashaw, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 
31, 32 (Utah App. February 14, 1992). Moreover, when 
interpreting a statute, Utah courts "generally assume each term 
of the statute should, if possible, be given an interpretation 
that is in accord with the commonly accepted meanings of its 
words." Hector, Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Association, 741 
P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
The language of Utah's evidence tampering statute is 
plain and unambiguous: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in the proceeding or investigation[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510(1) (1990) (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests 
that admissibility of the evidence for other purposes is a 
prerequisite to the prosecution of an evidence tampering charge. 
Rather, as the trial court recognized, the statute prohibits 
tampering with "anything" that may be used in an investigation or 
proceeding, regardless of its admissibility. 
The trial court properly construed the term "anything" 
in keeping with its commonly accepted meaning. In so doing, the 
trial court refused to insinuate a technical and legalistic 
definition where the legislature elected to use non-legalistic, 
common terminology. In short, the trial court applied § 76-8-
510(1) in keeping with its plain language based on fundamental 
principles of statutory construction and interpretation. On that 
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basis alone this Court should uphold the trial court's ruling. 
Should this Court nevertheless decide to consider the 
legislative intent underlying § 76-8-510(1)f an examination of 
the statute's legislative history provides additional support for 
the trial court's interpretation of the provision. 
POINT II 
A REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP S 76-
8-510 DEMONSTRATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE 
INTENDED TO PROHIBIT TAMPERING WITH ANY 
EVIDENCE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE EVIDENCE 
WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 
If this Court decides that the language of § 76-8-510 
is not plain and unambiguous, then it should "try to discover the 
underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the meaning and 
purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history." 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990) 
(citations omitted). A review of the statute's legislative 
history demonstrates that the trial court correctly divined the 
legislative intent underlying § 76-8-510. 
Section 76-8-510 was enacted in 1973 as part of a bill 
sponsored by Senator Darwin C. Hansen. When debating the bill on 
the House floor, Senator Hansen explained that its provisions 
were based on the Model Penal Code.1 The evidence tampering 
provision of the Model Penal Code reads as follows: 
A person commits a misdemeanor if, believing that 
an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 
1
 Utah State House of Representatives, 318 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, 40th general session, 47th day of the Utah State 
Legislature, 3rd reading of H.B. 162, February 23, 1973, 
Audiograph #224, lines 7-9. 
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about to be instituted, he: 
(a) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any 
record, document or thing with purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in such proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(b) makes, presents, or uses any record, document 
or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to 
mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in 
such proceeding or investigation. 
Model Penal Code § 241.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
The language of Utah's evidence tampering statute is 
very similar to that of the Model Penal Code, with two notable 
differences. First, the Utah provision replaces the phrase "any 
record, document or thing" with the single term "anything." 
Second, while the model penal code classifies evidence tampering 
as a misdemeanor, § 76-8-510 categorizes evidence tampering as a 
second degree felony.2 These two differences suggest that the 
Utah Legislature intended to prohibit an expansive range of 
conduct and impose more harsh penalties than those called for 
under the Model Penal Code. Consequently, an understanding of 
M.P.C. § 241.7 must play a central role in the interpretation of 
§ 76-8-510. 
The commentary accompanying § 241.7 makes clear that 
admissibility of the evidence for other purposes is not a 
2
 The Utah Legislature is not alone in its decision to 
provide for a more stringent penalty for evidence tampering than 
that called for by the Model Penal Code. Indeed, the legislative 
history of § 76-8-510 indicates not only that it was based on the 
Model Penal Code, but that the enhanced penalty was likely 
prompted by similar action by the New Hampshire Legislature. See 
Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, at 211 (1973) (identifying 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641.6 (1955) as the source for § 76-8-
510). The New Hampshire statute and M.P.C. § 241.7 are virtually 
identical except that the New Hampshire statute classifies 
evidence tampering as a class B felony instead of a misdemeanor. 
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requirement for an evidence tampering charge. The commentary, in 
pertinent part, reads as follows: 
Avoidance of the word "evidence" indicates 
that liability for tampering does not depend 
on the admissibility at trial of the document 
or object involved. The question of 
admissibility is too elusive to serve as a 
determinant of liability for tampering. 
Evidence may be admissible for one purpose 
but not for another, allowable against one 
defendant but excludable by another, crucial 
to one charge but irrelevant to another. 
Thus, the issue of admissibility may not be 
subject to authoritative resolution in a 
hypothetical context. More importantly, 
evidence not admissible at trial may play a 
helpful and perfectly legitimate role in an 
investigation. It may lead to evidence that 
will be allowed at trial. Thus, restricting 
the tampering offense to actions that 
preclude the use or undermine the integrity 
of admissible evidence would be inconsistent 
with the essential rationale of preventing 
and punishing obstruction of justice. 
Virtually every revised code proscribes 
tampering with evidence without regard to its 
admissibility at trial, and a few statutes 
make explicit provision to that effect. 
Model Penal Code § 241.7, comments on section, at 179-80 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (footnotes omitted). 
The Model Penal Code commentary supports the trial 
court's determination that § 76-8-510 does not require that the 
evidence with which defendant tampered be admissible at trial for 
other purposes. Had the legislature intended otherwise, it could 
have expressed its dissatisfaction with the Model Penal Code 
commentary.3 
3
 Cf. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on 
the Fourth Amendment, § 11.4(j) at 459-60 (2d ed. 1987) 
("[IJncriminating admissions and attempts to dispose of 
(continued.. 
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To summarize briefly, both the plain language of § 76-
8-510 and the legislative history of the statute demonstrate that 
admissibility of the evidence at trial for other purposes is not 
a prerequisite for the prosecution of an evidence tampering 
charge. Based on this narrow issue, the trial court properly 
denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to the 
evidence tampering charge. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's ruling and affirm its interlocutory 
order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £*^ day of September, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZtfNGE& 
Assistant Attorney General 
3(...continued) 
incriminating evidence are common and predictable consequences of 
illegal arrests and searches, and thus to admit such evidence 
would encourage such Fourth Amendment violations in future 
cases."). 
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